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ABSTRACT 
The study examines the decision of three Nordic countries - Sweden, 
Finland and Norway - to apply for full membership in the European Union 
(EU). The membership negotiations were concluded in March 1994 and the 
European Parliament voted in favor of accession in May 1994. Depending on 
the outcome of national referendums, the three Nordic countries are expected 
to enter the EU on 1 January 1995, together with Austria. 
Although the Nordic countries were already deeply integrated with the 
EU in terms of trade and economy through EC-EFT A free trade agreements 
and the European Economic Area agreement, they had refrained from 
extending economic integration into political integration. In the case of 
Finland and Sweden, this "encapsulation" of integration was connected to their 
policies of neutrality and non-alignment in the Cold War climate. 
The study analyses the decision to apply for membership in the light 
ofregional integration theories. Traditional neo-functionalism working through 
a gradual spill-over mechanism can not explain the sudden shift in favor of 
membership. Instead, the applications are studied in the framework of 
intergovernmental institutionalism with emphasis on deliberate governmental 
decision-making. The initiative to apply was mostly an economic and business 
consideration. However, the decisive factor which enabled Finland and 
Sweden to reassess the compatibility of the EU membership with their policies 
of neutrality was the change in the international geopolitical climate since 
1989 which removed the image of the EU as a western block. 
OZET 
Bu <;ah~ma Nordik iilkelerinden Finlandiya, isve<; ve Norve<;'in 
Avrupa Birligine tam iiyelik ba~vurusu kararlanm incelemektedir. Uyelik 
gorii~meleri Mart 1994'de sonu9lanm1~ ve Avrupa Parlamentosu May1s 
1994'te yap1lan oylamada katihmm lehinde karar alm1~tir. Bu ii<; iilkenin, 
yapilacak olan ulusal referandumlann sonu9lanna bagh olarak, A vusturya ile 
birlikte 1 Ocak 1995'te Avrupa Birligine girmeleri beklenmektedir. 
Nordik iilkeleri, EC-EFTA serbest ticaret anla~malan ve Avrupa 
iktisadi Bolgesi anla~mas1 yoluyla ticari ve ekonomik baklmdan Avrupa 
Birligi ile entegre olmu~ olmalanna ragmen iktisadi entegrasyonu siyasi 
entegrasyona uzatmaktan ka9mm1~lardir. isve<; ve Finlandiya i9in bu tiirden 
bir "s1mrh" entegrasyon, bu iilkelerin Soguk Sava~ donemindeki bag1ms1zhk 
ve tarafs1zhk politikalan ile baglant1hd1r. 
Bu 9ah~ma, iiyelik ba~vurusu kararlanm bolgesel entegrasyon teorisi 
<;er9evesinde irdelemektedir. Geleneksel "neo-functionalist" teorinin zaman 
i<;erisinde geni~leme-biiyiime yakla~1m1, iilkelerin iiyelik lehine ani karar 
degi~imini a91klayamamaktadir. DolaylSlyla, iilkelerin ba~vurulan 
hiikiimetlerin bilerek ve isteyerek karar alma siire~lerinin onemine agirhk 
veren hiikiimetler aras1 kurumsa1c1hk (intergovernmental institutionalism) 
teorisi <;er<;evesinde incelenmektedir. Bu iilkelerin ba~vurulanndaki temel 
giidiiniin iktisadi ve ticari kaygular old~gu soylenebilir. Ancak, Finlandiya ve 
i sve<; 'in A vrupa Birligi iiyeligi ile tarafs1zhk politikalannm birlikteliginin 
olabilirligini tekrar gozden ge<;irmelerine yol a<;an temel faktor, 1989 ydmdan 
bu yana uluslararas1 jeopolotik atmosferde meydana gelen ve A vrupa Birliginin 
'Bati Bloku' imajm1 ortadan kaldiran geli~meler olmu~tur. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This study will examine the decision of three Nordic countries -
Sweden, Finland and Norway - to apply for membership in the European 
Union (EU). The membership negotiations were concluded in March 1994 and 
the European Parliament voted in favor of accession on 4 May 1994. 
Depending on the outcome of national referendums, the three Nordic countries 
are expected to enter the EU on 1 January 1995, together with Austria. 
The Nordic countries in question are already deeply integrated with the 
EU in terms of trade and economy through the European Free Trade 
Association (EFT A) and the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement. The 
EEA, agreed upon in 1992 and realized as of the beginning of 1994, extended 
the four freedoms of the Single Market, free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital, to the EFTA countries in most respects. In return, the 
EFTA countries accepted the Community legislation covering these areas. 
The latter stages of EEA negotiations were marked by several EFT A 
countries, including Finland, Sweden and Norway, moving to apply for full 
EC membership. Meanwhile, the European Community (EC) transformed 
itself into the EU with much deeper political integration, including common 
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foreign and security policy (CFSP), the program for economic and monetary 
union (EMU), and a framework for cooperation in home affairs and justice. 
Sweden and Finland have traditionally been reluctant to expand 
economic integration into political integration because of official policies of 
neutrality and non-alignment, and for fear of losing national authority in 
political decision making. Norway as a NA TO country did not have such a 
reservation, but the rejection of EC membership in a referendum in 1973 after 
successful accession negotiations prevented it from applying again. The second 
time around, it is counting on Nordic "momentum" behind its membership to 
win popular approval; it is clear that if Sweden and Finland enter the EU, 
staying behind means isolation. 
The fourth country expected to join on 1 January 1995, Austria, is not 
included in the main focus of this study, although the accession negotiations 
were conducted in parallel, and it shares most of the characteristics of the 
countries under consideration: EFTA and EEA membership, extensive trade 
relations with the EU, and adherence to a policy of neutrality and non-align-
ment. Hence, the argumentation presented will also apply to Austria, and 
references are made to it throughout the study. 
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The aim of the study is to identify the main reasons for the sudden 
change of opinion in favor of full EU membership in Sweden, Finland and 
Norway. This shift of position happened in a matter of two or three years 
starting from 1989. Because of the abrupt nature of the decision, the 
traditional explanation of a gradual deepening of integration through a spill-
over mechanism from economic integration to political integration cannot 
explain the process. The study includes a short overview of integration 
theories which have been used to explain the dynamics of European integra-
tion in the EC framework. The establishment and the initial success of the EC 
gave birth to neo-functionalist integration theories, but they fell out of fashion 
during a decade of stagnation from the 1960s to the late 1970s. The relaunch 
of the Community with the White Paper on the completion of the internal 
market in 1985, and the following adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) 
in 1987, rekindled the interest in integration theories. Traditional neo-
functionalism failed, however, to explain this sudden and radical stepping-up 
of the integration process. Among the wide literature on the SEA and 
integration theories, two main lines of theoretical interpretation can be 
discerned: "modern" neo-functionalist perspective and "institutionalized 
intergovernmentalism". Modern neo-functionalism, or "supranational 
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institutionalism", distances itself from the deterministic thinking of earlier neo-
functionalism, and concentrates on the internal dynamics within the EC 
emphasizing the deliberate efforts of the Community institutions to encourage 
further integration ("cultivated spill-over"), supported by transnational interest 
groups ("pluralistic spill-over"). Intergovernmental institutionalism, although 
recognizing the importance of supranational and transnational actors, places 
the national interests of the member states and interstate bargaining in the 
main role in explaining stepped-up integration. Common to both approaches 
is the rejection of the automatic spill-over mechanism as the only explaining 
factor, and consequently, greater emphasis on voluntaristic elements and inter-
governmentalism. 1 The main argument is that although economic integration 
may indeed proceed incrementally through functional-technical spill-over, 
political integration in most instances takes the form of sudden steps in the 
form of deliberate revision of political preferences. The initiative for change 
of opinion is explained to be controlled by mainly two factors: motivation in 
form of perception of external challenges2 or crisis within the system, and an 
abstance of restraints in the external environment. 
It should be noted here that integration theories have often been 
criticized as belated scientific responses to developments in the real world, 
4 
without predictive value. 3 Furthermore, since the famous "blind men and an 
elephant" -anecdote, where each man touched a different part of the animal 
and concluded that an elephant had the shape of the part he touched,4 most 
authors have agreed that no single theory is able to account for all aspects and 
steps of European integration, but they have to be used complementary to each 
other. 5 
The study aims to explain the change in political preferences in 
Sweden, Finland and Norway towards the EU membership summarizing the 
internal debate in these countries and connecting it to integration theories used 
to interpret European integration. The membership applications can be charac-
terized as deliberate decisions of moving from economic integration estab-
lished by interdependence through trade relations to political integration. The 
factors that made this decision possible are argued to be, on the one hand, 
motivation ("external threat" or "system crisis") in the form of deep economic 
recession, diminishing returns from EFTA and the EEA, and a fear of losing 
the opportunity to fully shape and take advantage of the Single Market; and 
on the other hand, the absence of restraints in the international environment 
as dramatic changes in the geopolitical setting after the fall of the Berlin Wall 
in 1989, and the subsequent end of the Cold War made it possible to 
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reinterpret the national policies of neutrality and non-alignment. The 
theoretical approach adopted is intergovernmental institutionalism with input 
from business interest groups. Traditional neo-functionalism with gradual 
functional-technical spill-over is clearly not explanatory for a sudden shift 
from economic integration into political integration, and supranational 
institutionalism does not fit the situation where the initiating party was the 
respective national governments, not the Community institutions. 
Before going further, one question of terminology should be clarified. 
The European Community was recasted into the European Union by the 
Treaty on European Union (commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty), 
agreed upon in December 1991, signed in February 1992, and put into force 
on 1 January 1994. Therefore, it would be correct to refer to it as the EC or 
the Community before that date, and then change it to the EU starting from 
1 January 1994. For the sake of convenience, however, there is some 
fluctuation as to how the names are used, and the reader can assume that they 
are used interchangeably. 
The study is organized in the following way. Chapter 2 gives a short 
overview of the development of EC-EFf A relations, culminating in the EEA 
agreement. The enlargement policy of the EU is explained in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 4 discusses the characteristics of the three Nordic countries, both in 
terms of economy and foreign policy orientation. It also includes Commission 
opinions on the membership applications. Chapter 5 summarizes the accession 
negotiations. After a short overview of the success of different regional 
integration theories to explain the dynamics of European integration in the first 
section of Chapter 6, the decision of the Nordic countries to apply for full 
membership in the EU is rationalized by economic necessity and the absence 
of foreign policy restraints in the present international environment. The 
analysis relies on the presumption that contrary to traditional neo-functional-
ism, political integration mainly depends on deliberate decisions made by the 
political elite with input from the change in perception and opinion of different 
interest groups. Economic integration, working through functional-technical 
spill-over, is considered a necessary, but not sufficient precondition for this 
upgrading of integration process. Some future implications of the accession 
of Sweden, Finland and Norway to the EU are discussed in Chapter 7, espe-
cially in respect to Nordic cooperation. The last chapter contains a short 
conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EC-EFTA RELATIONSHIP: AN OUTLINE 
2.1 FROM SEPARATION TO INTERDEPENDENCE 
When the European Communities were established in the 1950s - first 
the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951152, then the European 
Economic Community and Euratom in 1957/58 - all of the Nordic countries 
chose to stay outside. Instead, Sweden, Norway and Denmark joined the 
European Free Trade Association (EFT A) as original signatories of the 
Stockholm Convention of 1960, together with other Western European 
countries which had not joined the EEC. Finland became an associate member 
of EFT A in 1961, and a full member as late as 1985. Iceland has been a full 
member of EFTA since 1970. The initial separation of the two institutions 
started to diminish when the UK and Denmark joined the EC in 1973, and a 
network of free trade agreements between the EC and individual EFT A 
countries were negotiated the same year. It has been observed that while 
during the 1960s both the EC and EFTA concentrated on enforcing their 
internal trade relations, the following decades were characterized by stable or 
declining internal trade and an increase in EC-EFT A trade. 6 This progression 
in the EC-EFT A relations has been delineated by describing the 1960s as 
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"separation", the 1970s and early 1980s as "pragmatic bilateralism", and after 
the relationship started to take the form of an open-ended agenda with an aim 
of ever closer cooperation based on slow political upgrading in the mid-1980s, 
as "combined bilateralism and multilateralism" .7 
The share of intra-regional trade in total trade is often used as an 
indication of economic integration and interdependence. Until the mid-1980s, 
EC-EFTA interdependence was asymmetric in the sense that the importance 
of the EC to the EFT A countries as an export market was much more 
pronounced than the importance of EFTA market to the EC. 8 However, 
goods from the EFTA countries sharply increased their share of the Communi-
ty market in the period 1985-1991, jumping from 8.9% to 22.4% of 
Community imports. Community exports of goods into EFTA countries 
constitutes a quarter of its exports.9 Nowadays, the trade of Sweden, Finland 
and Norway with the EC is around 50% of both their exports and imports, 
with the importance of EFTA diminished. The same is true for Austria to an 
even higher degree. Table 1 shows the structure of trade of these countries in 
respect of intra-EFTA trade and trade with the EC. It should be remembered, 
however, that individually none of these countries are indispensable for the 
EC: on a country by country basis, they have relatively minor importance for 
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the Community. For example, Sweden accounts for 5.1 % of Community 
imports and 5.2% of Community exports, and Austria 4.5% of imports and 
6.5 % of Community exports. 10 Thus, EFTA countries are much more 
dependent on the Community market than the EC is on individual EFT A 
countries. 
Table l: Structure of Trade, 1990 
==================================== 
Country Imports from (%) 
EC EFTA 
Exports to(%) 
EC EFTA 
Exports as 
% of GDP 
==================================== 
Finland 
Sweden 
Norway 
Austria 
44 
56 
46 
68 
19 
17 
24 
7 
44 
52 
65 
64 
20 
20 
16 
11 
25 
32 
36 
36 
=================================== 
Source: Jens Thomsen, "The Monetary Dimension," in Helen Wallace (ed), 
Th.e Wider Wesrern Europe. Reshaping rhe EC!EFTA Relarionship (London: 
Pinder 1991), 82. 
2.2 EEA NEGOTIATIONS 
The relationship between EFT A and the EC had developed since the 
1970s through free trade agreements negotiated between individual EFT A 
countries and the EC. The effect of this network of agreements was free trade 
in industrial goods between EFTA and the EC. Connected with their interest 
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in profiting from the EC's internal market program, the EFTA countries 
started to look for a new way to deepen their relationship with the EC in the 
mid- l 980s. 11 
The program for the European Economic Area (EEA; or the European 
Economic Space, as it was called in the beginning of the negotiations) was 
launched in April 1984, when the two organizations adopted the Luxembourg 
Declaration, stating their aim to establish a wider free-trading zone through 
closer cooperation. 12 Assimilation of the EFT A countries into the EC was not 
politically conceivable at the time, and thus the President of the EC Commis-
sion Jacques Delors, came up with an alternative which he described as a 
"more structured partnership with common decision-making and administrative 
institutions" .13 The agenda for future negotiations was set in a joint EC-
EFTA ministerial meeting in December 1989. It included, among other things, 
the goal of achieving the free movement of goods, services, capital and 
persons ("the four freedoms" of the Single Market), strengthened and 
broadened cooperation in other areas, such as R&D, environment, education, 
working conditions, social welfare and consumer protection, and reduction of 
economic and social disparities between the regions. In return to the free 
access to the internal market, the EFT A countries would submit to acquis 
11 
communauraire in the fields covered by the EEA agreement. The formal 
negotiations started in June 1990 and were concluded in October 199 l. The 
agreement was signed in Oporto in May 1992, and came into force on 1 
January 1994. 
The extension of the four freedoms to the whole EEA area (encompass-
ing the 12 EC member states and 6 EFTA member states after Switzerland 
failed to ratify the agreement) marked the formation of the largest integrated 
economic area in the world with 18 countries and 372 million people. The 
negotiators were careful not to venture to potentially controversial areas, such 
as the Common Agricultural Policy, foreign policy or taxation, and certain 
areas, such as fisheries and transportation, were covered by bilateral side-
agreements allowing for exceptions and transitional periods. 14 Furthermore, 
it should be kept in mind that the EEA is not a customs union like the EC, but 
an improved free-trade area. 15 
The obvious question arises then, as to why the EFT A countries began 
to desert the EEA structure in favor of full EC membership. Austria applied 
for EC membership in July 1989, Sweden in July 1991, Finland in March 
1992 and Norway in November 1992. To put it the other way around, why 
12 
were the EEA negotiations initiated if it was foreseeable that a majority of the 
EFTA countries would move towards EC membership in the near future? 
The answer to the second question is that in the mid- or even late-
1980s, the neutral EFT A countries (Austria, Sweden, Finland and Switzer-
land) could not reconcile the Western European block image of the EC and 
its cooperation in foreign policy matters with their national policies of 
neutrality and non-alignment. Further, they could not accept the supranation-
ality of decision making in some of the EC institutions, as they assigned great 
importance to sovereignty and national authority. However, the EEA process 
was increasingly seen more as a tactical agreement than a long-term solution 
from the point of view of both negotiating parties. It was useful for the EC to 
delay further membership application while completing the internal market, 
solving the budgetary question (the so-called Delors II package), accommodat-
ing the Eastern Lander of Germany within the Community, and taking 
political integration one step further through the vehicle of the Treaty on 
European Union. Meanwhile, the EFTA countries wanted "to keep the process 
moving while enabling some of them to put off final, and potentially 
damaging, political decision over membership". 16 
13 
The year 1989 was a turning point in the non-aligned countries' 
position. The end of the Cold War and consequently the disappearance of the 
block-based structure of Europe the EC had contributed to, made it possible 
for them to reassess the compatibility of the EC with their respective policies 
of neutrality. This was the most important reason for the shift in favor of full 
membership, and will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
The EEA negotiations had not been problem-free, and the agreement 
included provisions the EFTA countries felt uncomfortable with. The short-
comings of the EEA were mainly in the fields of institutional structure and 
decision-making procedure. The creation of an independent EEA Court was 
rejected by the European Court of Justice as incompatible with the Treaty of 
Rome, and a separate EFT A Court had to be established, which did not guar-
antee the harmonious interpretation of law throughout the EEA. No legislative 
powers were transferred to the EEA. The EEA Joint Committee could only 
decide whether to adopt new acquis communautaire. The EFT A countries 
have only an unspecified right to be consulted over new EC legislation during 
the decision-shaping process with no formal powers over the content of acquis 
extended to the EEA. In effect, the EFTA countries were left without any say 
over the substance of legislation they were to be subject to. Because the EC 
14 
Council of Ministers makes its decision concerning the functions of the 
internal market by qualified majority, a supranational element of being bound 
by rules some EC member countries had objected to, was inserted to the EEA. 
The EEA Surveillance Authority, with competence in the field of competition 
law also has supranational powers. The introduction of supranational elements 
into the EEA agreement was the first time the EFT A countries departed from 
intergovernmental decision making. The supranationality of some EC 
institutions was one of the reasons EFT A countries had not applied for full 
membership, because of the fear of losing their national autonomy. The last 
criticism of the EEA decision-making process from the point of view of the 
EFTA countries was the presumption that they could "speak with one voice" 
in the Joint Committee. The EFTA countries have diverse concerns and 
interests, and up until that point, the EFT A structure did not expect such a 
high degree of coordination. 17 
The shortcomings of the EEA from the point of view of the EFTA 
countries proved one thing: "only by joining the club can you get the rights 
the members have" .18 The EEA was not a real alternative for most of the 
EFTA countries, just a partial adjustment on the way towards an even closer 
association. 
15 
CHAPTER 3 
EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT POLICY 
When the EEA negotiations were initiated, the party on the other side 
of the negotiation table was the EC. When the individual membership 
applications came under consideration, they were in effect applications to join 
the European Union although they were submitted before the Union actually 
came into effect. The EU represents a deepening of European integration, 
adding new characteristics: a program for the economic and monetary union 
(EMU), including the European Central Bank and a common currency, 
introduction of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) to replace 
European political cooperation, cooperation in the areas of justice and home 
affairs, bringing into the Union competence fields that have traditionally been 
considered belonging to areas of sovereign national decision making, and 
establishment of European citizenship including political rights. 19 
The Nordic candidates for membership had traditionally limited their 
integration into the areas of trade and economy, but now the time had come 
for all of them to reassure in their membership application that they had no 
reservation about political integration, including adopting common foreign and 
security policy, and future participation in the economic and monetary union. 
16 
Immediately after the Maastricht Treaty had been agreed upon in 
December 1991, the Council of Ministers asked the Commission to prepare 
a report examining the implication of the Treaty on other European states 
wishing to join the European Union. The Commission presented its report to 
the Lisbon European Council in June 1992. 20 
The Commission report set guidelines for conditions for new members 
(paragraphs 7-13). According to Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome and 
Article 0 of the Maastricht Treaty, "any European State may apply to become 
a member". The Commission did not try to give a static definition of "Europe-
an", but instead referred to a combination of geographical, historical and 
cultural elements which all contribute to "European identity". Secondly, the 
Commission referred to Article F of the Maastricht Treaty, and concluded 
that, apart from European identity, a successful candidate for Union member-
ship must satisfy the criteria of democratic status and respect for human 
rights. The fulfillment of obligation of member states under the Treaty further 
requires that applicant countries have a functioning and competitive market 
economy and an adequate legal and administrative framework (par 7-9). 
Paragraph l 0 of the Community report set very definite conditions on 
adherence to the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). Applicant states 
17 
should accept the CFSP without reservations also with regard to the future. 
The saying used was "as it evolves over the coming years". This is an 
example of thefinalire polirique of European Union membership. The Union 
does not allow deviations from the CFSP for the sake of a policy of neutrality 
and non-alignment; the paragraph continues in the following way: 
"An applicant country whose constitutional status, or stance in interna-
tional affairs renders it unable to pursue the project on which the other 
members are embarked could not be satisfactorily integrated into the 
Union." 
The formulation used is slightly milder than the corresponding 
paragraph in an unofficial preliminary report drafted by the Commission in 
November 1991, which said: 
"Neutrality would be incompatible with such common policies which 
are likely ultimately to lead to mutual military assistance, membership 
of WEU/NATO, joint military forces and planning, etc. "21 
The next condition for membership candidates is adoption of the acquis 
communauraire, i.e. the acceptance of the rights and obligations, actual and 
potential, of the community system and its institutional framework (par. 11). 
It was further clarified that in the field of the CFSP, the acquis will include 
the Maastricht Treaty and its political objectives (par. 13). The Commission 
considered the adherence to the CFSP so paramount that the absolute subscrip-
tion to its principles, now and in the future, is once more repeated in par. 17. 
18 
Among the EFTA countries applying for membership, Finland, Sweden 
and Austria had traditionally followed a policy of neutrality and non-
alignment. As it will be discussed in the next chapter, the two Nordic neutral 
states long considered the political aspect of the EC to be an absolute obstacle 
for membership, although within the EC, foreign policy formulation was in 
an embryonic stage. The changes in the geopolitical environment since 1989 
made it possible for these countries for the first time to consider full 
membership, even in the EU, where the CFSP was now much more 
institutionalized and committed, with the possible result of common defence, 
military assistance and membership in "European" defense organization (most 
probably WEU, but reference was also made to NATO in the draft report). 
The shift of opinion happened very quickly: in late 1990 Finland still rejected 
Sweden's proposal to make a common application as premature22 (Norway 
also rejected it, but for other reasons). Although membership in the WEU has 
not been officially discussed in Finland, the most recent commentators do not 
rule it out. n 
The Commission also discussed the position of the EFT A countries 
which had applied for membership at the time - Austria, Sweden, Finland, and 
Switzerland. It concluded that there would not be "insurmountable problems" 
19 
from the economic point of view either for them or for the Union, and that 
these countries would actually strengthen the Union. The Commission also 
counted it as a plus for the EFTA applicant that they had already adopted a 
large part of the acquis communautaire following the EEA Agreement. In this 
respect, the EEA served as a stepping stone. However, the Commission 
warned about possible difficulties with a number of sensitive fields that were 
not covered by the EEA (par. 16), and the compatibility of neutrality with the 
CFSP (par. 32). It concluded that negotiations with these countries could be 
opened after the Maastricht Treaty was ratified and the budgetary question 
solved (par. 33). 
The Commission report also discussed problems connected with 
institutions and decision-making procedures in the face of a much larger 
Union, and the position of other countries that had applied or were potential 
applicants for membership. Although these issues are beyond the scope of this 
study, some references to them will be made in the closing chapter. 
The European Council in Lisbon passed a short list of conclusions 
based on the Commission report. 24 It agreed with the Commission that the 
negotiations with the applicant EFTA countries could be opened as soon as the 
Maastricht Treaty was ratified and Delors II package on Union resources 
20 
agreed upon, and asked the Commission to start the preparatory work. The 
European Council stated that the accession of the four EFT A countries was 
possible on the basis of the institutional structure included in the Maastricht 
Treaty. It clearly wanted to speed up the enlargement to the affluent EFT A 
countries. The Commission reference to institutional restructuring would come 
up earliest in the 1996 intergovernmental conference on revision of the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
One of the two preconditions for opening enlargement negotiations was 
fulfilled when a budget package for the next seven years was adopted in the 
Edinburgh summit in December 1992. Meanwhile, the fulfillment of the 
second condition had encountered difficulties: the rejection of the Maastricht 
Treaty by the Danes in 1992, the following ERM crisis throughout Europe, 
and debates on the Treaty in several other countries. It looked like the 
ratification of the Treaty and the realization of the European Union would be 
delayed. Thus the Edinburgh summit modified the condition by agreeing that 
enlargement negotiations with the EFT A applicants could be started in the 
beginning of 1993. However, the negotiations could be concluded only after 
the Treaty had been ratified, and had to based on the acceptance of the 
principles in that Treaty. The next European Council meeting in June 1993 in 
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Copenhagen foresaw the progress in the negotiations, and set a tentative 
timetable for the accession to be on 1 January 1995.25 
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CHAPTER 4 
COUNTRY PROFILES 
4.1 BASIC STATISTICS 
Before moving to more detailed country profiles including both 
economic factors and foreign policy orientation, the following table will 
display some basic statistics about the three Nordic countries. 
Table 2: Basic statistics 
------------------------------------
Factor Finland Norway Sweden 
==================================== 
Population (m) 
GDP (1992) 
(billion $) 
GDP per capita 
(1991; $) 
GDP growth 
(1991) 
GDP growth 
(1992) 
GDP growth 
(1993) 
Budget balance 
(1992) 
Unemployment 
(1992) 
Inflation 
5m 
112. 7 
24,845 
-6.4 
-3.6 
0 
-8.9 
13.1 
1. l 
4.3 m 8.6 
112.6 245.9 
24,854 27,498 
1.6 -1.7 
3.3 -1. 7 
1.5 -2.0 
-2.8 -7.1 
5.9 5.3 
2.6 -0.6 ~ 
==================================== 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook (1994), IMF International Financial 
Statistics (1994). 
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Note: GDP per capital average in the EC member states in 1991 was $ 
17,697. My calculation based on OECD statistics. 
4.2 SWEDEN 
Sweden formally applied for EC membership on 1 July 1991, during 
the latter stages of the negotiations concerning creation of the EEA. Sweden 
had always considered it necessary to cooperate with the EC in the fields of 
trade and economy, but stopped short of political integration; it regarded its 
policy of non-alignment and neutrality to be incompatible with the EC. 
Another reason for not applying for full membership has been the view that 
national sovereignty would suffer too much from submittance to extra-
territorial and supranational authorities. 
The evolution of Sweden's EC policy can been divided into four 
phases. 26 At the time of the creation of the EEC, Sweden was in favor of a 
wider and looser free-trade network containing no aspects of a customs union, 
ideological underpinning or extra-territorial authorities. The establishment of 
the EFTA in 1960 by the Stockholm Agreement suited Sweden's needs 
perfectly, particularly as none of its three main trading partners (Norway, 
Denmark and the UK) were original signatories to the Treaty of Rome. 
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In the 1960s, Sweden opened negotiations on closer association with 
the EC three ti mes (1961, 1967, and 1969-70), but never considered the full 
membership option. Although intra-EFTA trade increased during the 1960s, 
Sweden saw its importance diminishing towards the end of the decade, 
particularly because of the "defection" of several member states. Britain, 
Denmark, Ireland and Norway were candidates for EC membership, and the 
first three joined the EC in 1973 after long and complicated negotiations. All 
of the Swedish negotiation initiatives were characterized by insistence on 
special concessions with regard to external trade and foreign policy, 
neutrality, and maintenance of national sovereignty. Sweden ended up with a 
limited free-trade agreement similar to those the EC signed with other EFTA 
states in 1973. No political commitments were included in this agreement. 27 
The 1970s were characterized by deepening economic ties between the 
EFTA countries and the EC. However, there was no spill-over effect into the 
field of political cooperation. For the first half of the decade, Sweden empha-
sized its non-alignment policy with the lead of Prime Minister Olof Palme. Al-
though there was a change in the governing party in 1976 in favor of the 
center-right, political attitudes did not shift to a more favorable stand towards 
the EC. 28 
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The 1980s marked a new start in closer cooperation with the EC, 
initiated by Palme2'\ who had returned to power with the Social Democrat 
Party. In 1987, the government declared its commitment to further integration 
of Sweden with Europe through the legislative proposal "Sweden and West 
European Integration", excluding, however, foreign and security policy: 
"We shall further develop Nordic cooperation, we shall strengthen 
EFT A at the same time as we extend and deepen cooperation with the 
EC as far as this is compatible with our policy of neutrality. "30 
Sweden now took a leading role in the negotiations concerning the 
strengthening of the EC-EFT A relationship. While the EEA agreement was 
negotiated, the Swedish Foreign Minister suggested in 1990 to Norway and 
Finland that they should jointly apply for full EC membership. Although this 
proposal was rejected at the time, the problems connected with the EEA, deep 
economic recession in Sweden, and Austria's application for full membership 
in the summer of 1989, moved Sweden in July 1991 to be the first Nordic 
EFTA country to apply for full EC membership. 
From the Swedish point of view, the neutrality question is the most 
difficult one to reconcile with EC membership. Sweden's policy of neutrality 
is not de jure neutrality as in the case of Austria and Switzerland, but de facto 
active political neutrality. The Swedish policy of neutrality is based on 
historical traditions and restrictions imposed by the Cold War block confronta-
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tion, and characterized by active foreign policy participation in the UN and 
solidarity with Third World interests. 31 On the one hand, practising a 
unilateral policy of neutrality is complicated by problems with political 
recognition and credibility, but on the other hand it gives the country a 
possibility to adjust it according to national interests, as a statement by Olof 
Palme, "we alone determine Sweden's policy of neutrality", clearly shows.32 
The question of redefining neutrality is more complicated for Austria and 
Switzerland, because of their de jure policies of neutrality, connected with 
such abstractions as "Swiss identity" in the case of the latter, discussed below. 
It should also be noted that the international environment plays a part in the 
choice of policy, and thus de facto policy of neutrality is often reactive instead 
of active. 33 
Although Sweden is a visible participant in most international organiza-
tions, it has regarded the EC as a threat to neutrality. Nordic opinion has been 
that the neutral states face political constraints on integration which outweigh 
the economic benefits for integration. Opinions in this respect changed quite 
quickly following the end of the Cold War: in May 1988 the Swedish Prime 
Minister lngvar Carlsson stated that neutrality remained the primary obstacle 
to Swedish membership34 , Sweden applied in the summer of 1991, and in 
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December 1991, Prime Minister Carl Bildt welcomed the contents of the 
Maastricht Treaty by saying: 
"[Sweden's] willingness to participate actively, as a member of the 
Community, in the cooperation (sic) in the field of foreign policy and 
security cooperation, considering that this cooperation will mean that 
the Community will be able to contribute with reinforced strength and 
consistency to security, stability and cooperation in the development 
of the new Europe"35 
Unlike Austria, Sweden applied for EC membership without mention-
ing maintenance of neutrality as a condition. The membership negotiations 
were conducted on the basis that Sweden would fully participate in the 
common foreign and security policy. 36 
The end of the Cold War was a necessary condition in the change of 
Sweden's policy towards participation in the political aspect of the EC. The 
"block-aspect"37 of the EC had disappeared. It was no more a "Western" 
European institution but "a potential pan-European institution promoting 
European security in the broadest sense"38 , and consequently, EC member-
ship had become compatible with Sweden's neutrality. The experiences of 
other neutral countries, namely the Republic of Ireland's since 1973, and 
Austria's decision to apply in 1989, point in the same direction.39 The 
redefinition of the compatibility of the Swedish policy of neutrality with the 
EC was influenced by domestic interests, the international system allowing. 
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It has been argued that Sweden's policy of neutrality necessarily includes the 
element of maintenance of peace with prosperity, and that membership in the 
EC had now become a condition for prosperity, while changes in the 
international environment made it no danger to peace.40 
The established trade linkages between the EC and Sweden are 
extensive. For Sweden, the EC is a more important market than the EFTA 
countries (see Table 1 ). Sweden is the fourth biggest importer to the 
Community market and the fifth largest export market of Community 
products. 41 Swedish firms have expanded aggressively to the Community 
market. 42 The serious recession in Sweden since 1989 (see Table 2) has made 
the Swedes reconsider the commitment to "the Swedish model" of a welfare 
state. According to the latest statistics, recovery is not yet on the way. 43 
Although the EEA guarantees free access to the Single Market, the opinion 
began to shift, starting from business circles, toward the direction that 
economic integration could and should be connected with political integration. 
Gradually, developments both in the European political climate and domestic 
economic problems crafted a political consensus among major parties that EC 
membership was inevitable and that Sweden needed the EC. 44 
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The Commission completed its opinion on Sweden's application on 31 
July 1991, a month after the Lisbon summit. 45 As towards the other EFTA 
applicants, the Commission opinion was very favorable. Sweden is one of the 
most affluent countries in Europe, with GDP per capita 20% higher than the 
Community average. It had already accepted lots of acquis communautaire 
through the EEA agreement. No problems were foreseen with regards to 
EMU, because Sweden had unilaterally linked its currency to the ECU since 
1991, although it had to drop out on the outset of the ERM crisis in 1992. 
Despite the recent years of recession, Sweden's performance in economic and 
monetary policy is comparable to or better than the EC average. The Commis-
sion concluded that "The Union will on the whole benefit from the accession 
of Sweden, which would widen the circle of countries whose prospective 
economic, monetary and budgetary performance is likely to contribute to the 
development of the economic and monetary union. "46 Sweden was expected 
to strengthen the Union in several other fields, such as social and environmen-
tal policy and R&D. As possible problem areas, the Commission mentioned 
agricultural policy, regional policy and state monopolies (especially the state 
alcoholic beverage monopoly). Swedish agriculture is heavily subsidized 
because of harsh Arctic climate and government efforts to support regional 
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cohesion and traditional life-style; thus adaptations in the Swedish policy are 
necessary for compliance to the Common Agricultural Policy. Similarly, 
regional differences in development has provided justification for high levels 
of regional aid not compatible with EC economic and social cohesion plans. 
On the other hand, parts of Sweden hardest hit by the recession might qualify 
for EC aid because of high levels of unemployment.47 
The question of Sweden's policy of neutrality received special 
attention. Although the Commission acknowledged that Sweden itself had 
expressed its willingness to full participation in the CFSP, it recommended 
that according to its opinion expressed in the report on enlargement, "specific 
and binding assurances from Sweden should be sought with regard to her 
political commitment and legal capacity to fulfil the obligations in this 
area. "48 Laursen has commented that by this statement, which the Commis-
sion attached to its opinions on all of the neutral EFT A countries' applica-
tions, the EU was asking a higher degree of commitment than some of the 
current members. particularly the UK, the Irish Republic and Denmark, are 
showing towards the CFSP presently. 49 
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4.3 FINLAND 
Finland applied for EC membership on 18 March 1992. The geop-
olitical situation of Finland and the foreign policy it had practised since the 
Second World War caused it to consider a long time before making the 
decision to open the EC membership negotiations. The reasons for the change 
in opinion were mostly the same as in the case of Sweden, namely the changes 
in the global political climate and recent deep domestic economic recession. 
However, Finland's situation was more complicated because of its policy of 
peaceful co-existence with the former Soviet Union. Finland had been 
extremely cautious about Western European integration, and maintained strict 
neutrality in order to stay out of a possible superpower conflict. It had tried 
to balance its relationship with Western Europe and the former Soviet sphere 
of influence. 50 Although Finland had struggled to be recognized as neutral 
since the Second World War, the exercise of independent Finnish foreign and 
security policy were constrained by the Paris Peace Treaty, and the Treaty on 
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty signed with the Soviet 
Union in 1948. The Friendship Treaty was abrogated in January 1992. Before 
the gradual disintegration of the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence, it 
was out of the question for Finland to join Western European political 
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integration. The following account 1s a tell-tale indication of the careful 
Finnish attitude: 
"The last President of the Soviet Union, Michail Gorbachev, spoke at 
Finlandia Hall in Helsinki in 1989, only a few days before the fall of 
the Berlin Wall. Gorbachev's main message to his Finnish audience 
was crystallized in a single sentence from his speech: "Finland is a 
neutral Nordic country". After hearing these words, the distinguished 
Finnish audience interrupted Gorbachev with a standing ovation - not 
because they themselves were not aware of their own international 
position but because Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader who was 
ready to recognize it openly. "51 
Finland's integration with Western markets was based purely on trade 
agreements without political commitment. It has been commented that Finland 
"encapsulated" economic integration by steering away from any political ele-
ments. 52 In 1961, soon after the establishment of EFTA, Finland negotiated 
an association agreement. It became a full member in EFT A as late as 1986. 
However, Finland participated actively in EFTA-EC integration starting from 
the early 1970s, and the free-trade agreement with the EC dates from 1973. 
Despite some initial hesitation, Finland also entered the further deepening of 
the EFTA-EC relationship starting from the Luxembourg Accord in 1984 
which finalized into the EEA Agreement of 1992. 
When it came to enhancing economic integration with political integra-
tion, the Finns were still wary. The relationship between EFTA and EC was 
considered the maximum integration solution. The redefinition of the role of 
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politics in European integration started in 1987, when both the Prime Minister 
and the Foreign Minister expressed the opinion that the Finnish policy of 
neutrality would not be an obstacle for participation in Western European 
integration. At that stage, membership in the EC was still ruled out on the 
basis that participation in a supranational arrangement would undermine 
domestic autonomous decision making, which was considered a necessary 
element of neutrality, and a guarantee of trustworthy posture towards the 
Russians. 53 The change in integration policy was reinforced following the 
changes in the geopolitical setting, and in February 1992, the President of the 
Republic Mauno Koivisto opened the parliamentary session by recommending 
application for EC membership, which got the support of all three of the 
nation's largest parties. 54 The end of the Cold War, Sweden's previous 
membership application, the fact that the EEA agreement had left the EFTA 
countries practically without means to influence the decision-making con-
cerning common issues, and deep economic recession after losing trade with 
the Soviet Union were the main reasons for moving towards applying for full 
membership. 55 
Through the EEA Agreement, Finland had already achieved a high 
degree of integration, mostly economic, but also in certain respects political 
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integration. The Finnish membership application stated that because the 
division between Western and Eastern Europe, to which the Community had 
in certain respects contributed, had disappeared, it was now an institution 
contributing to the political and economic development of the entirety of 
Europe. Furthermore, it was stated that Finland now saw the EC as the best 
way to achieve the best things for the country. 56 As the President of the 
Republic put it in his speech in Brussels on 28 October I 992: 
"The Community plays an ever more important role in the determi-
nation of the developments in our continent. We are planning to 
participate in this process. We have carefully studied the obligations 
connected with the accession to the EC. With our membership appli-
cation, we accept acquis communauraire, the Maastricht Treaty and the 
political goals of the European Union. "57 
Within the political goals of the EU, the two that have aroused the 
most discussion among Finnish commentators, are EMU and the common 
foreign and security policy. The former was debated because after having 
linked its currency, the markka, to the ECU in 1991, Finland was the first 
European country to drop out of the system in the autumn of 1992. The 
Finnish currency crisis was caused by deep economic recession, the worst 
since the Second World War. Nevertheless, the Finnish membership 
application and statements accompanying it restated a commitment to EMU .58 
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Taking into account the traditional "broad" neutrality of Finland, the 
adherence to the common foreign and security policy was potentially 
problematic. However, the government assured that its commitment would 
also cover this area. The statement of Foreign Minister Heikki Haavisto at the 
meeting of the EU's enlargement conference in November 1993 was simple: 
"Finland accepts the provision of the Maastricht Treaty on a common 
foreign and security policy. We look forward to actively contributing 
to its implementation. In the light of this, I do not find this Chapter to 
pose problems to Finland, and we are therefore prepared to close 
it. 115'1 
Still, there remains an understanding that the "core of neutrality", 
including military non-alignment and independent defence should be 
preserved. The national security risks posed by a potentially unstable Russia 
have been widely discussed in Finland. Even after withdrawing its troops from 
the Baltic states, the two most important Russian military installments in the 
North-West, the Leningrad military district and the Kola Peninsula, border 
Finland. For the time being, the question of Finland joining the WEU or 
NA TO has been deferred. Finland is not joining the EU with military security 
in view, but to enhance political and economic security. 60 
The Finnish economy is living through its deepest recession since the 
Second World War. The GDP growth has been negative or remained constant 
for four consecutive years (1990-1993), unemployment was over 15% in 
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1993, and the country is running a high public deficit. The situation can not 
be explained only by referring to common economic downturn in Europe or 
cyclical reasons. The Commission opinion on the Finnish membership 
application especially pointed out that apart from the fact that Finland has in 
general neglected investment in export industries, the concentration on 
bilateral trade with the former Soviet Union for several decades explained why 
Finnish industry was unexposed to the market forces of international trade, 
and thus had reduced competitiveness. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
deprived Finland of approximately 25% of its markets. Finnish industry has 
to reconstruct and regain its competitiveness in European markets. Deep 
recession, combined with a commitment to maintaining social welfare, also 
affected public finance, where more austerity is required. 61 Regardless of its 
recent bad economic situation, Finland still remains one of the most affluent 
countries in Europe in terms of per capita income, and has a strong industrial 
base, although with a heavy reliance on timber, wood pulp and paper 
industries. Like the other Nordic applicants, national protection of Arctic 
agriculture vis-a-vis the Common Agricultural Policy of the EC was expected 
to be a problem in the accession agreements, and special guarantees to 
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adherence of the CFSP, similar to those of Austria and Sweden, were 
requested. 
4.4 NORWAY 
Norway was the last of the countries under consideration to apply for 
EC membership. It submitted its application on 25 November 1992. Norway 
had made two previous requests to join the EC, in 1962 and 1967. The 
accession negotiations were successfully concluded in 1972, but the Norwe-
gians rejected membership in a referendum, with 53.6% of votes against. 
Instead, Norway negotiated a free trade agreement with the EC in 1973. With 
the other EFT A countries, Norway gradually deepened the relationship. The 
fact that other Nordic EFT A countries had applied for full EC membership 
and the realization that the EEA would not adequately safeguard Norwegian 
interest in the longer run, combined with changes in the European geopolitical 
environment, convinced the Norwegian Government to open new membership 
negotiations. 62 Although Norway is a member in NATO, it felt that with the 
decreased interest of the United States towards the European security question, 
it was left out of European foreign and defence policy decision-making, 
increasingly conducted in the framework of the EC and definitely an important 
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part in the future EU. 63 Besides, the end of the Cold War enabled Finland 
and Sweden to consider joining the EC, and thus Norway would benefit from 
a Nordic "momentum" to influence public opinion on the issue. 
Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland explained the 
changed position of Norway in her speech to the Norwegian Parliament on 16 
November 1992, expressing particular concern about the negotiated decision-
making mechanism of EEA: 
"It is the countries that part1c1pate in the cooperation that will 
determine its further course, not those that remain on the outside. 
Given that decision by the EC will have a profound effect on our 
country, we should also participate in this important new phase of 
European cooperation as we have done in EFT A throughout the entire 
post-war period. "64 
As in the case of the other EFTA countries applying for the full 
membership, the Commission's opinion was very positive. Nevertheless, 
several problematic areas had emerged. The Commission referred in particular 
to the agricultural sector, Norway's regional policy, fisheries, state aid, and 
state alcohol monopoly. Norway's fisheries policy had already proven a 
difficult issue to solve during the EEA negotiations. Fisheries do have a 
traditional importance in Norwegian economy, contributing 6% to total 
exports. Norwegian accession would increase the tonnage of the Community 
fishing fleet by 17% and the number of fishermen by 10%. Norway's fishing 
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zones extend to 200 miles, and the main problem to be solved was its demand 
to protect their fishing zones in the North Sea against Spain and Portugal's 
fishing fleets. The Community would not allow such protective measures. The 
fishing issue remained central in the Norwegian membership negotiations. An-
other controversial sector is agriculture. Because of harsh Arctic climatic 
conditions, subsidies to agriculture considerably exceed Community levels, 
and are further enhanced with a regional support program noncompatible with 
the EC's economic cohesion policy. Producer prices in Norway are twice 
those in the EC. Compliance to the Common Agricultural Policy of the EC 
would require major reforms in the Norwegian agricultural policy. No major 
problems were expected in the field of economy in general, although the 
Commission noticed a heavy reliance on oil, natural gas and energy pro-
duction. In terms of macro-economic indicators, Norway is one of the most 
prosperous countries in Europe, and its performance in monetary and 
exchange rate policy is well in line with the EMU requirements with an 
already established link to the ECU. As a particular strength, the Commission 
cited Norway's commitment to environmental issues, with positive future 
contribution to the deepening in this sector within the Community. The area 
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of foreign and security policy was not considered problematic, as Norway is 
a founding member of NATO and an associated member in WEU. 65 
4.5 OTHER EFf A COUNTRIES 
Austria is a fellow candidate for EU membership with Sweden, 
Finland and Norway. It was the first EFTA country to apply for full EU 
membership during the EEA negotiations. Among the EFTA countries, 
Austria has the highest percentage of exports to the EC. Austria's exports also 
have the special feature of being highly sensitive to changes in Western 
European integration patterns: since the establishment of the EC until the 
negotiation of EFT A free-trade agreements with the EC, Austria's exports 
decreased significantly, but recovered afterwards substantially. 66 
Austria shares most of the characteristics of the Nordic EFT A 
countries: problems in reconciling the policy of neutrality and non-alignment 
with political integration into the EU, long-established economic integration, 
including co-ordination in monetary policy by linking the Austrian Schilling 
to the DM, and special concerns in some limited sectors, such as agriculture 
and regional policy, and, in the case of Austria, transportation. 
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Austria's policy of permanent neutrality is different from Sweden's and 
Finland's policy of neutrality because it is based on national legislation and on 
international public law. The legal basis in national law is the Constitutional 
Law on the neutrality of Austria of 26 October 1955, and in international 
public law, the notification of that Law to each state with which Austria had 
diplomatic relations in 1955 or has established since. Acceptance of notifica-
tion by any other country (such as all of the current EC member states) means 
that it recognizes and honors Austria's neutrality. The international public law 
aspect of Austrian neutrality poses several legal difficulties with regard to the 
treaties establishing the EC and the Maastricht Treaty provisions on common 
foreign and security policy. The Austrian application included a note that it 
was applying with the understanding that it would maintain its neutrality. 
Although the negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty had not been concluded at 
the time the Commission issued its opinion on the Austrian application, it 
indicated that special assurances from Austria would be requested as to 
participation in the future CFSP.67 Austria's policy of neutrality has also 
lately gone through reinterpretations, as the growing sense of insecurity due 
to possible escalation of violence in and from the neighboring Balkans has 
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prompted Austria to look to European foreign and defence policy as a 
structure to enforce its neutrality. 611 
The Commission complemented Austria as being stable and strong 
economically, and thus equivalent to the current member states that can fully 
participate in Community projects, such as the internal market, EMU, 
strengthened economic and social cohesion. Austria's degree of economic 
integration was already advanced, and its monetary policy connected with the 
ERM through the link between the Schilling and the DM. The Commission 
concluded that the accession would not require or cause any fundamental 
changes in Austria's economic policy. Apart from some agricultural subsidy 
questions, the Commission identified as the most problematic issue transpor-
tation. Austria is a transit country in the heart of Europe, and has adopted 
very restrictive transportation policy because of the growth in the road transit 
thought the Alps. During the EEA negotiations separate bilateral transportation 
agreements were negotiated between the Community and Austria, as it refused 
to accept the EC common transportation policy. Apart from these agreements, 
Austria has adopted several unilateral measures and regulations to limit 
transportation on Alpine roads. As justification, Austria quotes the high costs 
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of building Alpine roads and air pollution due to truck-traffic as an envi-
ronmental reason. 6Q 
Iceland joined the EEA Agreement, but is not considering applying for 
EU membership. Iceland's national economy is based on fishing industry, and 
the conditions of the EU's Common Fisheries Policy would severely harm its 
interests. 70 The fisheries question was solved through bilateral agreements in 
the EEA. 
Switzerland has been a permanently neutral country de jure since the 
1815 Vienna Congress. Traditionally the Swiss Federal authorities had 
considered neutrality as an absolute obstacle for participation in the EC, or, 
for that matter, other international organizations. Only from the beginning of 
the 1990s, the opinion began to shift from the previous stand of incompati-
bility to the understanding that it was possible to maintain the Swiss identity 
and neutrality even within the EU.71 Switzerland took part in EEA negotia-
tions and signed the agreement, but its ratification was stopped by a 
referendum on 6 December, 1992, in which the Swiss voted by 50. 7 % against 
joining the EEA. Switzerland had already decided to apply for full member-
ship, but the rejection of EEA left this application suspended for consider-
ation. 72 Some commentators have speculated on different options Switzerland 
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has in finding new paths towards participation in European integration, 
considered a necessity for the country. 73 After Liechtenstein voted for 
participation in the EEA, Switzerland remains the only Western European 
country outside the Single Market. 
Because of the Swiss rejection of the EEA, Liechtenstein faces institu-
tional problems. Although it decided by referendum to participate in the EEA, 
it must modify its ties with Switzerland in order to be able to do so. These 
modifications will require an amendment in Liechtenstein's constitution. 
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CHAPTER 5 
MEMBERSHIP NEGOTIATIONS 
5.1 NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CANDIDA TES 
The time-table for the negotiations was set to ensure that the European 
Parliament would be able to vote on the accession74 before it went into recess 
to prepare for the European Parliamentary election to be held on 9 and 12 
June 1994, and thus achieve accession on the date set by the Copenhagen 
summit as of I January 1995. The deadline for concluding the negotiations 
was to be the end of February 1994. 
Right from the start of the negotiations it was clear that areas where 
it would be most difficult to find solutions would be agriculture and regional 
aid in the case of all of the applicants, fisheries policy with Norway, and 
transportation policy with Austria. Common foreign and security policy was 
not problematic of all. Illustration of this was the statement made by the 
Finnish Foreign Minister quoted on p. 31, as among the candidates, Finland 
was presumed to be forced the most to request reservations in this respect 
because of its difficult geopolitical location. In light of the opinions expressed 
in the Commission report on enlargement policy emphasizing full commitment 
to the CFSP, this question would conceivably have been most difficult to 
46 
reconcile. However, no problems were encountered. By the first week of 
February, the CFSP was one of the chapters concluded with all of the appli-
cants. 75 
In addition to not finding solutions to some of the sensitive fields with 
the four applicants, the Union was also unable to find a common position in 
some of the issues. Throughout the negotiations, the southern countries of the 
Union, led by Spain, were unhappy with the agricultural and regional policy 
initiatives. These countries, with heavy reliance on agriculture and regional 
aid, were opposed to granting aid to the agricultural sectors of Nordic 
countries and to Austria to maintain unproductive Arctic and Alpine agri-
culture traditionally subsidized through national regional aid programs. Their 
position is understandable, as the applicant countries are clearly the most 
affluent countries in Europe as a whole. In the case of Norway, Spain and 
Portugal strongly opposed the compromise on the fisheries issue. Germany 
and Italy had special concerns about transportation through Austria.76 
The deadline was slightly missed, but the beginning of March brought 
about the conclusion of negotiations with Sweden, Finland and Austria. 
Adjustments to the common position were needed in order to reach the end of 
negotiations. Political accords with Sweden and Finland were reached on 1 
47 
March 1994, and similar efforts were coming to an end with Austria. It was 
decided that negotiations with Norway over the fisheries issue would resume 
on 7 and 8 March because of deadlock. n 
Sweden won the debate on the conditions of regional aid, as it was 
agreed that sparse population density would be added to the criteria. An 
exchange of notes between the Commission and Sweden will accommodate the 
country's objective of being able to carry on extensive regional aid programs 
such as those prior to membership. A new structural fund instrument, 
Objective 6, was introduced to support regional and structural aid in northern 
and central areas of Sweden. Support for agriculture in northern Sweden 
would be maintained at its current level. Sweden's net contribution to the 
Union budget would be phased-in over a period of 5 years. The concession 
in the position of Finland was that only 85 % of the arable land area would be 
eligible for support, whereas it had requested 100% of the country to be 
included to the less-favored areas provisos. The whole of Finland would be 
eligible for Nordic and national agricultural aid. Quotas for sugar and milk re-
mained, although in diminished form. Finland would become a net contributor 
to the EU budget only after the first membership year. On the road transporta-
tion issue Austria won an "environmentally-oriented" agreement. The existing 
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EEA bilateral agreement would stay in force at least until the year 2001, and 
could be extended to the end of the year 2003 depending on gas exhaust 
emission levels. n 
Norway and the Community finally reached a compromise on the 
fisheries issue on 16 March, including deals on access to waters, resources, 
and market, and fish resources management, combined with a time-table for 
integration of Spain and Portugal into the common fisheries policy.79 
5.2 INTRA-COMMUNITY DEBATE 
Although the negotiations were now concluded with the four applicant 
countries, an intra-Community debate continued on institutional chapters. Two 
problem areas were unresolved: new members' participation in EMU and the 
Council of Ministers voting rules. Although the applicant countries had ex-
pressed their full commitment to EMU, and the Commission had not seen any 
problems in that respect as the countries had already directly or indirectly 
participated in the exchange-rate mechanism, Spain raised an objection to 
including the new countries in the calculations of convergency criteria which 
determine the entry into the third stage of EMU. Spain's rationale was that 
because the applicant countries' economies are more stable than those of some 
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of the present member countries, compliance with the criteria would become 
more difficult; for example Spain might be left outside the third stage of 
EMU. Spain waived its reservations after the President of the Commission and 
creator of EMU, Jacques Delors, assured Spain that the transition is not 
strictly a matter of simple calculations, but a political decision. 80 
A far more difficult question to solve was the size of the blocking 
minority in the Council of Ministers after the new countries' entrance. The 
Council decision-making procedure has been a controversial issue since the 
creation of the Community. The EC is a rare institution in the field of 
international organizations in the respect that apart from normal intergovern-
mental agreements, supranational powers to make legally binding decisions is 
included. Commissioners functioning in an individual capacity and promoting 
the Community interests with no regard to national interests is the best 
example of this. Even within the Council, a basically intergovernmental 
institution, most of the decisions are passed with qualified majority instead of 
requiring unanimity81• The supranational element in Council decision making 
had already caused a crisis in the past. The original EEC Treaty included a 
transitional period for replacing unanimous decision making in the Council by 
a qualified majority in many fields as of 1966. France was opposed to using 
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qualified majority voting in agricultural pricing decisions, and put forward 
several proposals on linked matters. Other countries' refusal to accept them 
led to the French "empty chair" policy and a complete deadlock in Council 
decision making. In order to resume work a compromise was drafted, known 
as the Luxembourg Accords, in January 1966. It was agreed that in a case 
where a qualified majority should have been used, a country could claim "very 
important interest" and voting would be postponed for a "reasonable" period 
of time, during which negotiations would continue in order to establish a con-
sensus. The French interpreted "reasonable" to mean possibly an indefinite 
period of time. The effect of the Luxembourg Accords was that for the next 
decade there was practically no voting in the Council. Although the Accords 
were not legally binding, they were respected as a "gentlemen's agreement". 
The Accords caused a legislative stalemate resulting in a climate of stagnation, 
"Eurosclerosis", that lasted until the adoption of the internal market program 
in 1985, and the enforcement of a qualified majority voting in the Single 
European Act in 1987. 82 
A similar kind of debate over supranational decision making came up 
in connection with the enlargement negotiations. According to a simple 
mathematical formula, the new members should have votes in the Council in 
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the following fashion: Sweden 4, Austria 4, Norway 3, and Finland 3.83 The 
total number of votes in the Council would increase from 76 to 90 votes. The 
qualified majority would be 63 instead of 54, or, to put it the other way 
around, votes required for the blocking minority would increase from 23 to 
27. It has to be remembered that the Council votes were not changed after 
German unification, which brought 17 million more Germans into the Union, 
but the question of institutional reforms was postponed until the inter-
governmental conference on the revision of the Maastricht Treaty which will 
be held in 1996. It is true that the votes do not exactly correspond to the 
population size of member states, but at least using the best approximation, 
the qualified majority had always been and would be if the formula was to be 
used, around 70% of the total population.84 
The UK and Spain rejected the arithmetic adjustment and insisted that 
the blocking minority should remain 23, even when the number of total votes 
in the Council is increased to 90. The block by 23 votes makes it possible for 
two big member states which have 10 or 8 votes (eg. the UK and Spain) and 
one small state to veto any proposal in the Council. The reasons for insisting 
on the 23 votes rule were different for the UK and Spain. The latter, with 
support from Italy, was worried about the weight in decision making moving 
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towards northern interests. Keeping the size of the blocking minority down 
would enable the Mediterranean countries to look after their special interests, 
especially agriculture and regional aid. For the UK the reason was much more 
fundamental: it wanted to reduce the use of supranational decision making on 
every occasion. The blocking minority of 23 among 90 votes casted would be 
easy to convene in almost every issue, and thus it would become impossible 
to use the qualified majority decision-making mechanism. The UK has always 
been against the federalist approach of most of the continental countries, and 
wished to re-introduce intergovernmental decision-making based on consensus. 
Also, it saw it would be easy to collect 23 votes from the northern countries 
to veto issues with solely southern "spendthrift" interests. It was claimed that 
Britain wanted to "widen and weaken" the Community by diluting internal 
cohesion and making evolution towards intergovernmental cooperation based 
on consensus inevitable. Simultaneously, the European Parliament who was 
to vote on the enlargement, stated that it was in favor of arithmetic adjust-
ment, and would not approve accession if the blocking minority was not in-
creased to 27 votes. Several compromises were sought: tying the blocking 
minority directly to how large percentage of the Community populations it 
represents, or using different minority rules depending on whether a "big" 
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country is evolved or not (23 and 27 votes, respectively). Akin to the interests 
played out during the Council voting debate, the final compromise proposed 
by the Presidency was very much like the Luxembourg Accords. It was 
proposed that even though the qualified majority would be increased to 64 
votes (thus, the blocking minority to 27 votes), in cases where the majority 
did not exceed 68 votes (thus, minority 23 votes), the minority states could 
ask for further effort ("reasonable" time in the Luxembourg Accords) to reach 
a compromise. 85 
The Council convened into an informal meeting in Ioannina, Greece, 
at the end of March to solve the voting question. The agreement reached, 
called either the "Ioannina compromise" or the "Pangalos compromise" after 
the name of the Presidency of the Council, included the main lines of the 
latest proposal, but with specification that other member states would be able 
to challenge how long a time period is "reasonable", and to elicit voting 
through a fall-back to the Council's Internal Regulations. This rule eroded the 
British interpretation that "reasonable" can mean an indefinite period. The 
compromise further promised a setting-up of a Committee of "wisemen" or 
"special representatives" to prepare the institutional revision question for the 
1996 intergovernmental conference, and thus conferred that the compromise 
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was valid only for a limited duration. The compromise looked acceptable, and 
Spain was ready to close the issue. It took a longer time for Britain, partially 
for reasons of domestic politics, but finally it had to succumb in order not to 
be labeled as the spoilsport of the enlargement negotiations. It should be noted 
that Britain has always been in favor of widening. Surprisingly, the British 
Prime Minister made a public statement that the compromise was legally 
binding. Quickly, the Presidency made a public statement stressing that like 
the Luxembourg Accord, this compromise was only a political understanding 
with no legal form. However, the European commentators rushed to predict 
that the loannina compromise would be a bigger obstacle to the Council deci-
sion making, and consequently to deepening of the Union than the Luxem-
bourg Accords had ever been. 86 
The last step to be taken was the vote in the European Parliament. 
Throughout the institutional debate, individual MEPs had strongly condemned 
any deviation from the mathematical formula, and announced that the EP 
would vote against the accession of the four applicants if any compromise in 
blocking minority was included. However, after the representatives of the 
applicant countries had asked the EP not to postpone their accession, a busy 
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campaign to count votes for and against started. 87 The vote was held on May 
4, and was overwhelmingly in favor (Table 3): 
Table 3: Voting on the accession in the European Parliament, 4 May 1994. 
------------------------------------
votes cast in favor against abstaining 
==================================== 
NORWAY 
AUSTRIA 
FINLAND 
SWEDEN 
456 
459 
459 
461 
376 
374 
377 
380 
24 
24 
21 
21 
58 
61 
61 
60 
-----------------------------------
* The European Parliament had 517 members at the time. A single majority 
(259) was needed. 
Source: The Economist, May 7, 1994, 30-31. 
The applicant countries will hold referendums on EU membership. 
Austrians already voted for the membership on 12 June. The next referendum 
to take place will be Finland's, on 16 October, 1994. The Scandinavians are 
relying on common momentum: because Norway is the most likely to reject 
membership, its referendum will be held last, under the assumption that if the 
others approve, the Norwegians can not tum in a different direction. 
Opinion polls national attitudes towards the EU membership have 
tluctuaded throughout the negotiation process and summer, with plenty of 
people still undecided on the issue. In countries who won concession at the 
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end of negotiations, such as Norway, polls have turned slightly more 
favorable. In the beginning of March, only 29% of the Norwegian voters were 
in favor of membershop, with 44 % against (rest undecided), whereas at the 
time of the end of the negotiations 41 % were in favor. Still, 49% of 
Norwegians were against the membership. 88 On the other hand, the intra-
Community quarrel on Council voting rules or realization of the effects of the 
adaptations required by the Community membership may have disillusioned 
some voters. For example, in Finland, at the time when the membership 
application was made (March 1992), 56% of the voters were in favor and 
28 % against (rest undecided), but in the beginning of April 1994 only 42 % 
were in favor of joining.89 The latest opinion polls in Finland are slightly in 
favor of membership, with 40% for and 37% against. However, the trend 
seems to be that voters still undecided join the anti-EU camp, and that they 
are slowly catching up. 90 Different Swedish polls have shown 52-54 % 
against, 46-48 % in favor. 
Once the membership agreements are accepted in referendums, ratifica-
tion in national parliaments is not assumed to be problematic, and if 
everything goes smoothly, the new countries will enter the Union as of 1 
January, 1995. 
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CHAPTER 6 
EXPLAINING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
6.1 REGIONAL INTEGRATION THEORIES APPLIED TO THE EC 
The interest in regional integration theories has closely been linked to 
the evolvement of the European Community. The original studies on regional 
integration were inspired by the creation and initial success of the European 
Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community. Ernst 
Haas and Leon Lindberg formulated what was to be known as the neo-func-
tionalist theory in the late 1950s and early 1960s. At the center of the theory 
was the presumption that integration in one sector would have a "spill-over" 
effect to integration in other sectors. Further, it was assumed that the spill-
over could occur from economic to non-economic, i.e. political sectors, 
resulting in a supranational institution with the loyalties and expectations of 
the political actors transferred from national settings towards a new centre 
possessing jurisdiction over the preexisting national states. 91 
The regional integration within the framework of the EC was to be a 
laboratory to test the validity of neo-functionalism. The stagnation, both 
economical and institutional, in the EC from the mid-1960s till the 1970s, 
showed that the spill-over did not happen automatically, and that national 
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interests could replace the development towards a supranational institution. 
Most of the proposals for deepening the integration were ignored. Included 
here were the report of the Werner Committee in 1971 on monetary union, the 
1972 Paris summit resolution on transferring economic integration into 
political integration, and several other documents on political "European 
Union". The departure from the supranational decision making was not only 
apparent in the Luxembourg Accords, but also in the fact that the area where 
political cooperation was achieved was the foreign policy field, based on inter-
governmental cooperation. 92 Neo-functionalism fell out of fashion. 
Even the revival of European integration during the 1980s, resulting 
in the Single European Act (SEA), did not re-establish neo-functionalism in 
its original form, although the interest in regional integration theories in 
general was rekindled. The spill-over mechanism could not explain the sudden 
relaunch of the Community and the adaptation of such major decision as the 
SEA after more than a decade of stagnation. Neo-functionalism relies on 
incremental steps, whereas the changes in the mid- l 980s were abrupt, not 
logical and predictable consequences of earlier developments as theory pre-
dieted. Besides, had stepped-up integration developed according to theory, it 
should have occurred 10 years earlier. 93 
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Neo-functionalism was crafted into several variations. The notion of 
"spill-over" was modified into different mechanisms. The variation traditional 
neo-functionalist theory had used was now defined as "functional-technical" 
spill-over. The role of voluntaristic elements was increased: "cultivated spill-
over" denoting institutional decision-making bodies having an independent role 
in deliberately creating and cultivating different sectors and their interconnect-
ness as active supranational executives; and "pluralistic spill-over" referring 
to how integration in one sector brings about political pressures from various 
interest groups, including national governments and transnational business 
elites, for further integration. It depends on the chosen approach whether the 
importance of governmental elites or nongovernmental elites is stressed 
more. 94 These redefinitions added new voluntaristic and intergovernmental 
elements to the basic neo-functionalist notion of automatic spill-over.95 
Undirected incremental changes were not ruled out, but they are suspected of 
playing a bigger part in the gradual growth of interconnectedness rather than 
in dramatic changes. 
Many of the recent studies in European integration have concentrated 
in finding a theory that would explain the sudden momentum to adopt the 
Single European Act. There are two competing theoretical interpretations: 
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supranational institutionalism (also called modern neo-functionalism) and 
intergovernmental institutionalism. The former stresses the role of the Com-
munity institutions in shaping new policies with possible input from transna-
tional business groups and national governments.96 Intergovernmental 
institutionalism concentrates on studying the national interest played in 
interstate bargains, disregarding spill-over as the critical explanatory factor in 
explaining European integration. 97 However, most of the scholars at the 
moment seem to be of the opinion that different theories should be used in a 
complementary fashion in order to explain different stages in EC inte-
gration. Q8 
If the automatic spill-over mechanism is dismissed as the explanatory 
factor in integration, and the importance of voluntaristic elements is increased, 
there remains the decisive question as to what provides the initiative to 
political decision-makers, either supranational or intergovernmental, in the 
system to launch political integration projects. The most discussed factor is 
perceived external challenges or threats in the form of changes in the inter-
national environment. 99 A crisis can transform the goals or the interest 
perceptions of actors so as to increase new demands for deeper integration. 
Changes in the international environment have been used to explain the 
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establishment of the EC. In the 1950s, the external threat was in the form of 
political and security concerns. From the 1970s to the present, the external 
threat has mostly been of an economic nature. Moreover, it has been argued 
that within the EC, economic threat creates a stronger response than political, 
because it mobilizes a wider range of actors. In addition to political leaders, 
business circles and national electorates pressed by economic down-tum will 
become active. •m For example, the adaptation of the SEA has been 
explained to have been a response to the economic-technological challenge 
from Japan, wt in combination with a failure of economic policies in many 
member countries. 102 When it comes to economic crisis, it has been argued 
that what matters most in the process of European integration is not the 
political will of the member states to promote European unity in itself, but 
"the concern of member states about the costs of failing to satisfy the external 
demands on their economic efficiency and on their ability to take political 
decisions, which could no longer be met at a national level". 103 Political 
considerations still play their role: the deepening of the common foreign and 
security policy with the Maastricht Treaty has been connected to the 
disappearance of bipolarity and German unification. 104 However, it has to 
be taken into consideration that in most cases direct and immediate linkage 
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between external threat and integration responses are difficult to establish, and 
what actually matters more is the perception of a threat in conjunction with a 
time-lap. 
If political integration is linked to change in the environment, it is not 
sufficient to take into consideration motivation, but also the restraints, which 
can be both internal or external in the form of restraints imposed by the 
international economic or political climate. Both the motive ("threat" or 
"crisis") and the opportunity (absence of restraints) have to be present to 
enable a major political decision toward deepening the integration process. 
6.2 MOTIVATIONS AND RESTRAINTS FOR SWEDEN AND 
FINLAND 
In the framework of "motivation" and "restraints", the EFTA 
countries following policies of neutrality, such as Finland, Sweden and 
Austria, can be characterized by constant economic motivation to approach the 
EC since the initial separation restrained by the bipolarity of the international 
environment. Until 1989, all the steps taken were concerned with solely 
economic integration. 
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The first rapprochement after the separation between the EC and the 
EFTA countries occurred immediately after the "defection" of the UK, 
Denmark and Norway by applying for EC membership. The British decision 
was based on fear of being left out from an organization that was clearly 
developing into the strongest policy formulator in Europe. Thus Britain's 
decision was based on preventing a loss of opportunity to participate in policy 
making as a traditionally "big" European country. Denmark followed the UK 
because most of its trade was with it. The original reason for setting up the 
EFTA - dislike of supranationality and preference for intergovernmental 
decision making - did not disappear from their observed behavior. Both of the 
countries can be considered as "minimalist" in terms of the deepening the EC. 
The defection changed the atmosphere within the EFTA. Sweden, 
Switzerland and Austria asked for association with the EC, subject to 
neutrality reservations. The accession of the UK and Denmark to the EC in 
1973 left the remaining EFT A countries demoralized and in loss of a large 
part of their export market. Free trade agreements were negotiated to insure 
the access to the EC market as the importance of the EFT A diminished, and 
the success of the member countries' economies depended on the access to EC 
market. 
64 
The next move closer was the initiation of the EEA in the mid- l 980s. 
Although the EC-EFT A trade had gained in volume, both of them were facing 
keener competition from the US and Japan. Around the same time the EC 
launched its program towards the Single Market, and the EFTA countries 
wanted to take advantage of it by guaranteeing preferential access. Because the 
foreign policy concern of several EFTA countries following a policy of neu-
trality - Sweden, Finland, Austria and Switzerland - still ruled full member-
ship out of the question in the prevailing bipolar environment, a tightening of 
economic integration was the next best way. At the same time, the first effort 
to participate in decision making was made through joint EEA institutions, but 
with a dissatisfying outcome. The EEA could be characterized as ultimate 
economic integration without much political integration. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, a deep economic recession throughout 
Europe was experienced. Of the Nordic countries under consideration, Sweden 
and Finland were especially hard hit. In their case, factors other than the 
down-turn of the global business cycle contributed to the situation. Both of 
them had tried to maintain the "Scandinavian" model of a welfare state, 
resulting in high public expenditures and consequent budget deficits. In the 
case of Finland, the reliance on trade with the former Soviet Union had made 
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the industry in general non-competitive in Western markets. It has been 
commented that Finland had decoupled from world trade and continued to 
protect its own market from international competition. 105 Even before the 
relaxation of the global political climate, efforts were made to re-establish 
Finnish firms in the European market. However, until the disappearance of 
bipolarity, this approach was possible only for business leaders. A similar ad-
aptation can be discerned in the behavior of Swedish business. 106 In the case 
of both countries, this can be documented through investment in the EC 
markets. From 1985 to 1990, Finnish direct net investment in the EC 
countries grew sixfold, 107 and in 1990 Swedish outward investment was six 
times greater than inward investment, Swedish firms being the biggest 
investors in cross-border European acquisitions. 108 The interest of the 
business elite to be considered as an official move towards political integration 
was restrained only by official foreign policy concerns. 
The sudden changes in the international political climate, the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence since 1989, and 
the consecutive disappearance of the image of the EC as a "Western" 
European block made the re-evaluation of the relationship between economic 
and political integration possible. There were no more restraints in the global 
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environment. The change in political attitude towards the EC happened very 
quickly in both of the countries, even within the traditionally reluctant Social 
Democratic Parties. This has been attributed to the "unusual confluence of 
rapidly changing political and economic conditions, both in the international 
system ... and domestically [as] economic uncertainty ... [and] the deteriora-
tion in overall economic outlook". 109 
Two more factors have to be taken into consideration as internal 
restraints. First, why did the business elite not manage to influence foreign 
policy decision making earlier? Both of the countries under consideration here, 
Finland and Sweden, are characterized by political cohesion and consensus. 
Business circles did not want to "embarrass" the foreign policy leadership. 
The incorporation of these countries was not an economic act, but a major 
political decision which required the disappearance of the block-based 
structure of Europe. •w When the process got under way, the cohesion 
actually benefitted the process by making it faster. 111 In the case of Finland, 
the supporting factor was the "Swedish imperative"; never to be left out of 
markets the Swedish industry has access to. 112 
The second restraint was the reluctance to relinquish any autonomous 
decision-making power to a supranational institution. The strict adherence to 
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national autonomy was the dividing factor between the EC with supranational 
aspects and EFTA with intergovernmental cooperation. 113 However, the 
EEA agreement exemplified that the EC is not an easy bargaining partner. In 
a situation where it was clear that the EC had reserved legislative powers for 
itself, gaining the right of political participation in the formulation of rules and 
procedures which would become binding in any case weighted for more than 
potential political losses. 114 
Norway did not have the same external restraints as Finland and 
Sweden. The main obstacle for applying for membership had been the fear of 
repeating the same kind of embarrassing domestic debate staged in 1973 .115 
Overall, Norway's decision to apply can be characterized, together with some 
defence policy concerns linked with the decreased importance of NATO, as 
trying to prevent the situation of being isolated if other Nordic countries 
joined the EC, and taking advantage of the Nordic momentum. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE NORDIC GANG 
Cooperation among the Nordic countries has a historic and institutional 
basis. The Nordic Council functions as a forum for integration projects 
ranging from recognition of university diplomas, through harmonization of 
legislation and travel without passport requirement, to a common stand on 
foreign policy issues. The Nordic Council, which encompasses Finland, 
Sweden, Norway, Iceland, and Denmark, with a special voice for extraterri-
torial areas, has often been used as an example of regional political inte-
gration. 116 Denmark made reservations for both its accession agreement and 
the Single European Act, stating that nothing included in them could restrict 
its participation in Nordic cooperation in foreign policy issues. 
Now that four out of five Nordic countries will be members of the EU, 
some continental European observers have noted that they could possibly 
"gang-up" to support their particular interest against, let's say, the Mediterra-
nean countries. Although the Nordic politicians were brisk to comment that 
such fears are unfounded, they also recognized that "positive" Nordic 
cooperation would continue. 117 
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Still, other EU member states are watchful, not least because of the 
"minimalistic" approach Denmark has adopted in participation in some 
important fields of the Community acquis. 118 Denmark has traditionally seen 
European integration to be primarily economic in nature. Apart from the 
reservations to the original Treaty of Rome, Denmark faced difficulties in 
ratifying the Single European Act. Although Denmark favored further 
economic integration, it was hard for it to accept some changes brought by the 
SEA to the decision-making process. It saw this transfer of powers to the EC 
institutions as an erosion of its national autonomy. The SEA was rejected in 
the Danish Parliament, but the following national referendum turned in its 
favor. As in the case of other Nordic countries, the end of the Cold War 
changed Denmark's attitude towards political integration in a more favorable 
direction. However, this shift was based on completely different reasons: 
Denmark saw its southern neighbor, Germany, taking the form of a bigger 
unified Germany and growing to be the strongest nation in Europe. Political 
integration with Europe could now be interpreted as a way to control Germany 
through the EU mechanism. 119 
Despite the observed benefits of closer participation in the EU, the 
Danes rejected the Maastricht Treaty in a referendum on 2 June 1992. The 
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main stumbling block was the defence policy and idea of a single European 
currency. Although the Danes were in favor of economic integration, they 
were again afraid of losing too much of national political authority. Because 
a failure to ratify the Maastricht Treaty could have had wide-ranging 
repercussions for the future of European integration, the EC negotiated a 
special compromise with the Danish government in the Edinburgh summit in 
December 1992 to reconcile the situation. Denmark got authorization to opt 
out from certain provisions: no participation in the third stage of EMU, and 
no participation in the common defence policy including the WEU .120 It 
should be noted here that the requirements set for the three Nordic member-
ship applicants concerning participation to the CFSP rule out any reservations 
of this kind. Thus, the commitment required was much stronger than what 
Denmark was ready to give. This is surprising, because after all Denmark is 
already aligned with NATO (as is Norway), but Finland and Sweden have had 
strong policies of neutrality and non-alignment. 
The Edinburgh decision explicitly stated that the concession given to 
Denmark, the "Danish solution", is not replicable with other countries. Just 
before the beginning of membership negotiations, it was made clear by the EC 
Commissioner for External Affairs that only a time-limited exception from the 
71 
Maastricht Treaty could be granted to applicants, not permanent, as in the 
Danish case. 121 The fact that there would not be deviations from the full 
commitment to the CFSP was obvious already from the Commission report 
on enlargement and the special statements on the issue in the Commission 
opinions on the membership applications. All the public statements made by 
Finnish and Swedish politicians vehemently denied that they were planning to 
request something like the Danish solution from the Community.122 The 
traditional notions of neutrality and non-alignment appeared to be totally 
disregarded in the face of economic necessity to deepen the integration with 
Europe, when the opportunity had opened due to changes in the geopolitical 
climate. 
The most pressing concern for Denmark had always been the 
safeguarding of autonomy in national decision-making. The other Nordic 
countries had learned a different lesson from the EEA negotiations. The 
biggest disappointment with the EEA had been the low degree of influence 
over decision making within that arrangement. Without EC membership, the 
EEA countries would remain "second-rate" Europeans. The countries were 
willing to tolerate infringement on their autonomy in order to be a full-pow-
ered player in deciding further European development. This may be referred 
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to as the "small country syndrome" when the importance of access to markets 
and the right to political participation outweighs the potential losses in national 
decision making. m The other Nordic applicants did not want to be left with 
a periphery status in Europe. In addition, especially Finland desired to 
emphasize its European status124 after having lived in the shadow of the 
Soviet Union most of the century and created the notorious term, "Finlandiza-
tion". 
All of this is true at least for the attitudes adopted before and during 
the membership negotiations. The commitments expressed were very strong. 
The applicant countries had to be "good Europeans" in order to gain the right 
to enter. Based on his model of unipolar regional integration, Mourirzen has 
speculated that the other Nordic countries might start behaving like Denmark, 
i.e. demanding concession, earliest in the case national referendums went 
against the membership or latest when they have established themselves as 
members. 125 The model is unipolar, because the restriction to policy-makers 
of the bipolar power structure have disappeared. In this model, participants 
are classified as outsiders, would-be insiders, and insiders. The gist is that 
both the complete outsider and the full-power insiders have a lot of leeway in 
forming their stand depending on their national interest: the previous because 
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they have no obligations or aspirations to please the system, and the latter 
because they already established themselves and participate in the interpreta-
tion of the rules of the pole. The would-be insiders, however, have no leeway. 
They have to obey the rules established by the pole (like in the EEA to submit 
to Community legislation they have no power to shape) and to compete for 
goodwill of the pole in order to gain the access to the insider group. This 
stand-by model explains well the situation of the EC membership applicant. 
Economic situation in these countries forced them to move from an outside 
orbit to a would-be insider orbit when external restraints allowed it, and the 
acceptance depended on their "good behavior", i.e. expression of total com-
mitment. With well-established insider status they may start imposing special 
conditions. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
This study has examined the accession of three Nordic EFTA countries 
- Sweden, Finland and Norway - to the European Union. The process was 
followed up from the initiation of EFT A-EC negotiations on more structured 
relations following the Luxembourg agreement in 1984 to the favorable vote 
on accession into the EU in the European Parliament on 4 May 1994. 
The different stages of this integration process, especially moving from 
purely economic areas to political integration was explained in the framework 
of motivation and restraints. It was concluded that the most important 
motivation to the present candidates to change their position towards the EC 
membership was the fear of losing their European market combined with deep 
economic recession. The importance of intra-EFT A trade diminished starting 
from the 1970s, and the EC became the most important trade partner of the 
EFT A countries. At the same time, Europe was facing strong competition 
from Japan. The Community launched its internal market program to regain 
its competitiveness, and the EFT A countries wanted access to this market. 
The decisive factor enabling the neutral EFT A countries to apply for 
membership was the disappearance of external restraints in the form of the 
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end of the bipolar international system. Before, only transitory arrangements, 
stopping short of full membership, had been possible for many of the EFT A 
countries for reasons of policies of neutrality and non-alignment. Of the 
Nordic countries, Sweden and Finland belonged to this group. There are slight 
differences in the foundations of these policies; Sweden has a more idealistic 
approach to foreign politics, whereas for Finland, it is a geopolitically and 
historically imposed pragmatic way of balancing relations with the neighboring 
Soviet Union and market interests in Western Europe. For whatever reasons, 
the EC was long perceived as a "Western European" block contribution to the 
bipolar system of international relations. The end of the Cold War made the 
reconsideration of this interpretation possible. The disintegrated Soviet Union 
could not anymore influence the Finnish decision-making that much, and the 
EC emerged as an institution contributing to pan-European integration. 
Finland and Norway also had to safeguard their security interests. Norway felt 
that the declining interest of the US in the European security system in the 
framework of NATO, and the relocation of major European defence policy 
decision-making into the EU's CFSP diminished its possibilities to participate 
in the shaping of European security policy. 
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At the same time, business interest ("pluralistic spill-over) was strongly 
pressing toward an ever closer relationship with the EC. Economic recession 
had hit Sweden and Finland especially hard. Finland had lost approximately 
25 % of its foreign trade after Soviet disintegration. Long-established trade 
relations with the Soviets had also eroded the competitiveness of Finland in 
the Western market. The only way to regain an economic edge was to get into 
the European markets. Sweden faces similar problems with its "Swedish 
model". Closer integration with Europe was especially pressed by business 
interest groups, which had long tried to establish strong standing in Europe. 
On the other hand, Norway felt that staying outside if the other two Nordic 
countries joined would mean isolation on the periphery of Europe. 
The already negotiated EEA agreement did guarantee access to the 
internal market, but the EFT A countries saw big problems with the outcome. 
The decision-making mechanism on new legislation of the EEA was in 
practice left totally in the hands of the EC, without a possibility for the EFT A 
countries to participate in deciding the substance. One reason for especially 
Finland, Sweden and Austria to reject EC membership previously, had been 
the loss of national authority to supranational decision-making bodies. How-
ever, within the EC, all of the member countries have at least a chance of 
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shaping decisions, although the outcome can be decided by a qualified 
majority. These countries considered that option better than being left totally 
without say. 
Compared to previous enlargements, Austria, Finland, Sweden and 
Norway finished their accession negotiations in a short period of time. It took 
12 years for Britain, Ireland and Denmark to be accepted as members, 5 years 
for Greece, and 8 years for Spain and Portugal. This time around, the time 
lapse between the first application (Austria) and predicted accession date is 4 
years, and from the last (Norway) only slightly over 2 years. Naturally, the 
present candidates shared some very favorable features: they are more affluent 
countries than the Community average and they had already achieved a high 
degree of integration with the Community through EFTA free trade agree-
men ts, and especially, the EEA. The general opinion, shared by the Com mis-
sion and the Council, was that these countries would strengthen the Commu-
nity. It is significant that all the new member countries are expected to 
become net contributors to the Union budget after a short transitional period; 
previous enlargements had always been marked by ensuing budgetary crisis. 
Furthermore, some of the candidate countries were also ready to get in at 
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almost any price: recent deep economic recession and the disappointment with 
the EEA agreement made them see this as a necessity. 
This kind of a window of opportunity may not reappear in the near 
future. Almost all Western European countries which have a level of economic 
development comparable to the Community standards, and are willing to join 
(Switzerland and Iceland are not) are already included. Future enlargements 
will happen in the direction of south or east. Some of these countries have al-
ready applied, some earlier than the present candidates, either for EU 
membership or for an association status. The 1992 Lisbon summit did not 
recommend opening accession agreement with anyone additional to the four 
EFT A applicants. The opinion of the Community on the other applications 
was to postpone further enlargements for the time being for two reasons: the 
countries in question are not ready to join, and intra-Community institutional 
questions have to be solved first. However, after the accession negotiations 
were concluded with the four EFT A applicants, the Council moved to the 
direction that negotiations could be opened with the two smallest applicants, 
Malta and Cyprus, depending on achieving a settlement between the two 
Cypriot communities. 126 
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Central and Eastern European countries are not ready for membership 
in term of their economic performance or stability their political structures. 
The Union prefers to limit their association to the network of "Europe agree-
ments" 127 , although some of these countries are inspiring hopes of full mem-
bership. Turkey's relationship with the EU will be strengthened throught the 
completion of a customs union. 
When the Commission wrote its report on the enlargement question in 
1992, it already paid a lot of attention to institutional questions. It said: "The 
accession of new members will increase its [the EU's] diversity and 
heterogeneity. But widening must not be at the expense of deepening. Enlarge-
ment must not be a dilution of the Community's achievements. "128 Further-
more, it feared a loss of effectiveness in the face of a Union with more 
member states than before. Using a simple mathematical formula to increase 
the number or EMP in the European Parliament, granting every country at 
least one post of Commissioner, and adjusting the votes and number of votes 
required for a qualified majority in the Council of Ministers in a situation 
where the Union possibly had 20 or even 30 members, was considered a 
question that had to be solved before any new members would be accepted. 
The Commission conclusion was that a limited number of members, i.e. the 
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four EFTA applicants, could be accepted using the present rules, but before 
further enlargements the fundamental questions of decision-making and the 
institutional framework should be studied. A change in the number of member 
states will invariably influence the nature of any structure of the Union, 
starting from translation costs to the functioning of the Commission and the 
Council of Ministers. 129 The institutional reform issue will come up in the 
1996 intergovernmental conference on the revision of the Maastricht Treaty. 
The debate on Council voting rules at the end of accession negotiations 
was not connected to the present applicants per se. However, the fact that two 
member countries, Spain and the UK, started to promote their (different) 
national interest over the common position of the other ten, was already 
described as "a serious crisis" . 130 It became clear that the main reason for 
the UK to raise this problem was in order to reduce the use of supranational 
aspects of the Union, whereas other countries considered it as an essential 
feature of the Union. The British did not conceal their feelings: " ... this is a 
union of nation States ... ". 131 
As the depth of integration should be measured both in expansion in 
functional scope, and in terms of institutional capacity and decision-making 
procedures, this will cause concern for most observers. The EC and now the 
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EU have always been a battle field between member states who prefer 
supranational decision-making, "the federalists", and those who are reluctant 
to submit their national authority and instead prefer intergovernmental 
decision-making, "the confederalists". This debate goes to the roots of 
political integration, which has traditionally been defined as movement 
towards supranationality. The separation between the EC and EFT A originated 
from preferences towards either supranationality or intergovernmentalism. The 
four new members have traditionally belonged to the group that prefers 
intergovernmental arrangements. Combined with the possibility that the new 
members, or at least the three Nordic ones, will in future adopt the "minimal-
ist" approach characteristic of Denmark, the present enlargement may dilute 
the supranational features of the Union. In the same vein, they may be 
reluctant to participate in certain fields of the Community competence which 
they have traditionally perceived as questions of national sovereignty. 
Although the participation in the national foreign and security policy was 
assured during the membership negotiations, only by time we will learn how 
easily this concept is compatible with Finland's and Sweden's policy of 
neutrality. Though these policies have gone through a process of redefinition 
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in new circumstances in the international political climate, as concepts they 
are part of national consciousness. 
However, the new members are small countries, so they can not that 
much change the direction of the EU endeavor. They will strengthen the 
Union in terms of economic performance, and they may add their own imprint 
on certain issues, such as environmental and social policy, but their accession 
will also decrease internal cohesion. 
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